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Successful control measures have interrupted the local transmission of
human infectious diseases such as measles, malaria and polio, and saved
and improved billions of lives. Similarly, control efforts havemassively reduced
the incidence of many infectious diseases of animals, such as rabies and rinder-
pest, with positive benefits for human health and livelihoods across the globe.
However, disease elimination has proven an elusive goal, with only one human
and one animal pathogen globally eradicated. As elimination targets expand
to regional and even global levels, hurdles may emerge within the endgame
when infections are circulating at very low levels, turning the last mile of
these public health marathons into the longest mile. In this theme issue, we
bring together recurring challenges that emerge as we move towards elimin-
ation, highlighting the unanticipated consequences of particular ecologies
and pathologies of infection, and approaches to their management.1. Introduction
Controlmeasures have led to tremendous reductions in the incidence of infectious
diseases that affect human and animal health. Vaccination has successfully inter-
rupted circulation of poliomyelitis, measles, rubella and has drastically reduced
the incidence of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) and canine rabies throughout
the Americas; mass drug administration has significantly reduced the trans-
mission of lymphatic filariasis and onchocerciasis (river blindness) across their
endemic ranges, whereas the number of cases of dracunculiasis (guinea worm)
has fallen by more than 99 per cent since 1986 through behavioural interventions
without the use of either drugs or vaccines.
However, despite these successes, eradication per se of established pathogens
has been limited.Only one human (smallpox) and one animal (rinderpest) disease
have been eradicated to date.1 Both diseases were perceived as a major threat
and vaccination, the key intervention to interrupt their transmission, was a
priority long before the initiation of global eradication campaigns (figure 1).
Thermostable vaccines were developed for both viruses, eliminating the need
for a refrigerated supply chain (‘cold-chain’), and vaccines were kept to a
high standard, monitored by independent quality-control centres [1,2].
The smallpox and rinderpest programmes built on the experiences of previous
failed efforts to eradicate hookworm (1907), yellow fever (1915), yaws (1955) and
malaria (1955) [3]. Each of these ultimately unsuccessful efforts provided valuable
lessons. Mass treatment for hookworm did not cure, and therefore it only
decreased infection intensity. The existence of an animal reservoir in nonhuman
primates hampered yellow fever eradication [4]. The importance of large-scale
pilot programmes ahead of the eradication effort, ongoing research in parallel to
the programme and intensified surveillance during the endgame became evident
after the failure to eradicate yaws,2 via an effort that lasted from 1954 to 1967
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Figure 1. The number of countries endemic for (a) smallpox, (b) rinderpest
and (c) polio. Vertical line indicates the beginning of global eradication
initiative for respective diseases. (Online version in colour.)
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2when treatment with injectable long-acting penicillin was
prematurely discontinued. The Global Malaria Eradication
Programme (1955–1969) was primarily defeated by the emer-
gence of drug resistance and resistance of mosquito vectors to
insecticides, and was further hindered by high costs (billions
of US dollars even then) [6]. The structure of the programme
also proved too rigid for the different regional and local
requirements of malaria-endemic areas, and suffered from a
lack of research and community involvement [3,6,7]. By con-
trast, smallpox and rinderpest campaigns were flexible, and
relied on the involvement of local communities [8], with strat-
egies being constantly refined in response to ongoing
research and field studies [2,7,9].
The success of the smallpox and rinderpest campaigns
was also a function of the biology of these pathogens; and
the diversity of causes underlying the failures of historic era-
dication programmes reflects the diversity of the relevant
pathogens’ biology and population dynamics, and specifi-
cally how these dynamics were affected during the last mile
of elimination, or the endgame.
We use the term ‘endgame’ to refer to the final stages of an
elimination or eradication programme, when disease is still cir-
culating, although at much reduced levels (i.e. during the
epidemic tail illustrated in figures 1 and 2). For any disease tar-
geted for elimination, international organizations such as the
World Health Organization (WHO), World Organization for
Animal Health (Office International des Epizooties, OIE) and
the Food andAgriculture Organization (FAO) generally provide
guidance and/or a regulatory framework with epidemiological
orprogrammaticmilestones: theprogressive controlpathway for
FMD is one such example [10]; another is the pathway defined
for malaria elimination (http://www.who.int/malaria/publi
cations/atoz/9789241596084/en/index.html). While such
operational definitions are clearly helpful for specific pathogens,
for the multi-pathogen perspective taken here, we define‘endgame’ more conceptually. Specifically, we take it to refer
to the stage in the elimination programmes when the goal
seems in sight, and operational targets typically become time-
limited, because the intensity of effort required is too great to
be maintained indefinitely.
New and often unforeseen obstacles arise during the end-
game (see box 1 for an overview of endgame challenges for
different pathogens detailed in this theme issue). These may be
biological, operational, technical, economic or political in
nature. With this in mind, we solicited articles for this special
issue from a diverse range of authors covering these perspec-
tives. Here, we introduce why the endgame differs from the
‘middle game’ (or period where interventions are sufficiently
intense to control disease to some degree, but not sufficient to
dramatically change the ecology, or surveillance and control
needs) across pathogens that are currently targeted for local or
regional elimination or even eradication (see box 2 for defi-
nitions). We list major knowledge gaps across diseases, outline
some of the current issues in implementation of controlmethods
and finally, conclude by discussing prospects for success.2. Why does the endgame differ from the
middle game?
(a) Differing epidemiology
(i) Susceptible build-up
When infection is no longer circulating, or circulating at very low
levels, the epidemiology of the target pathogenmay change. For
immunizing infections, the number of susceptible individuals in
the population may increase during the ‘honeymoon period’ of
low incidence (and consequently low transmission) following
mass vaccination campaigns [35], or following local extinction.
Both phenomenamay result in huge outbreaks after susceptible
numbers reach a threshold level, or the infection is reintroduced
into an area where it had previously been eliminated. Massive
outbreaks have repeatedly been observed for measles, for
example in Mongolia in 2001 [36] and more recently in Burkina
Faso in 2009 [37], illustrating that effective interventions short of
eradication can lead to problematic short-term outcomes even if
immunity is lifelong. Perceived risk also falls because cases are
rare, but this is a fallacy; the effective reproductive number
(RE; box 2), increases owing to the accumulation of susceptibles,
thereby increasing the risk of a major outbreak.
(ii) Increase in the age of infection
Following the implementation of childhood vaccination cam-
paigns, the vast majority of young individuals are protected,
which can drive up the average age of infection. The measles
outbreaks described above, that occur in contexts where sus-
ceptibles have accumulated via a lack of large outbreaks, and
incomplete vaccine coverage, have much higher incidence in
older age groups. Increased age of infection can have nega-
tive ramifications. It can increase the burden and the costs
of infection (e.g. by increasing the number of cases of conge-
nital rubella syndrome [38]) or complicate surveillance, as
school-age or younger children are typically easiest to locate.
(iii) Waning of immunity
For immunizing infections where immunity needs boosting,
other issues may arise. Lack of natural boosting contributes
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Figure 2. Smallpox and polio elimination in the USA—the total number of cases. (a) Total reported number of smallpox and polio cases per year in the USA.
(b) Epidemic tail for smallpox and polio in the USA in years. Epidemic tail—years with less than 200 reported cases. (Online version in colour.)
Box 1. Pathogens targeted for regional or global elimination covered in this special issue.
Dracunculiasis. The first parasitic disease targeted for eradication, dracunculiasis (guinea worm) is caused by the parasite
Dracunculus medinensis following ingestion of water contaminated with larvae-harbouring copepods. Worms up to 1 m long
begin to emerge from infected people a year after drinking contaminated water. The number of cases fell from 3.5 million
in 1986 to 542 in 2012 [11] without the use of a vaccine or medical treatment—control efforts focus on providing non-
contaminated drinking water, vector control, community education and involvement supplemented by active surveillance
[12]. Political instability in the areas of Mali and South Sudan presents the biggest endgame challenge for eradication. The
estimated cost for the programme over three decades is $350 million [13].
Foot-and-mouth disease. FMD is a highly transmissible viral disease of cloven-hoofed animals, particularly cattle, sheep,
pigs, goats and deer, and is associated with tremendous economic losses. It is caused by an aphthovirus of the Picornaviridae
family that has seven different serotypes (O, A, C, SAT 1, SAT 2, SAT 3 and Asia 1); infection with one serotype does not
confer immunity against other serotypes. Vaccination protects from the disease, but does not prevent infection or carriage,
so certain regions prohibit prophylactic vaccination against FMD (e.g. the European Union) complicating trade. Control
methods focus on culling of infected and in-contact herds and strengthened border controls to prevent introductions from
endemic areas through regional movement of animals and their products. In South America, systematic mass vaccination
is being used to regionally eliminate infection [14]. Endgame challenges include maintaining high coverage, political commit-
ment and financial support, detecting carriers and confirming the change in status from disease-free with vaccination to free
without vaccination, as withdrawing vaccine prematurely can lead to re-emergence.
Lymphatic filariasis. Also known as elephantiasis, this disfiguring and debilitating disease is characterized by swelling of
the limbs and genital organs, kidney damage and painful swelling of lymph nodes. Lymphatic filariasis is caused by filarial
nematodesWuchereria bancrofti (90% of all cases), Brugia malayi and Brugia timori that are transmitted to humans through bites
of infected mosquitoes. Transmission can be successfully interrupted by the mass administration of donated drugs ivermectin
and albendazole, or with diethylcarbamazine and albendazole. Most cases are in India, Indonesia and Nigeria [13].
Inadequate political and financial support to scale-up mass drug administration, contraindications with the parasite Loa
loa that can cause fatal side-effects upon treatment, and political insecurity in certain areas poses the main challenges [15].
Malaria. Malaria is a mosquito-borne disease caused by four different protists of the Plasmodium genus that multiply in
red blood cells of infected humans, travel to the liver to mature and later reproduce in infected mosquitoes, ending the life
cycle. Malaria still takes a life of an African child every minute, and causes over 200 million infections a year [16], reinforcing
the poverty of sub-Saharan African countries through effects on fertility and population growth, productivity, savings and
investment, premature mortality and medical costs [17–19]. After a hiatus of over four decades, malaria elimination is back
on the global health agenda, inspired by the Roll Back Malaria Initiative launched by WHO in 1998 and the Gates Malaria
Forum in 2007. Main challenges include drug resistance and resistance of mosquitoes to insecticides. Contrary to popular
belief, stopping post-elimination transmission from imported cases might not pose a great challenge as there is evidence
that local elimination is surprisingly stable [20].
(Continued.)
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Box 1. (Continued.)
Measles. A highly contagious childhood viral infection, measles remains one of the leading causes of death of children
under 5 years of age despite the existence of an affordable and effective vaccine. Approximately 158 000 people died of
measles in 2010; more than 95% of those were in low-income countries with weak health systems [21]. Since its establishment
in 1974, WHO’s Extended Programme on Immunization (EPI) has been the main tool and driver of childhood immunization
against several diseases including measles. More recently, spurred by the millenium development goals (MDG) to reduce
childhood mortality, the Measles and Rubella Initiative has led to a 71% reduction in measles deaths from 1990 to 2011.
Main challenges include the build-up of susceptibles that are repeatedly missed by campaigns, the need to tailor control strat-
egies to specific demographic and public health contexts, and vaccine refusal in the developed world where incidence has
been very low for decades [22,23].
Meningococcal meningitis. Several bacteria can cause meningitis—a transmissible severe inflammation of the meninges,
or the protective lining around the brain and spinal cord—but Neisseria meningitidis is the one that causes large outbreaks in
the meningitis belt of sub-Saharan Africa. If untreated, it is fatal in half of all cases. Of the twelve serotypes of N. meningitidis,
six are epidemic (A, B, C, W135, X and Y). Conjugate polysaccharide vaccines are available for four serotypes (A, C, W135, Y);
for serotype B polysaccharide vaccines cannot be developed due to antigenic similarity with a polysaccharide in human
neurological tissues (vaccines based on outer membrane proteins are used instead; WHO fact sheet). In 2010 and 2011
more than 55 million persons aged 1 to 29 years in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger received conjugate vaccine that reduces
carriage and transmission. It is thought that high coverage in this age group can eliminate meningococcal A epidemics in
sub-Saharan Africa, but the main challenges are achieving and maintaining vaccine coverage [24].
Onchocerciasis. Also known as river blindness, onchocerciasis is caused by a parasite Onchocerca vulvus that is trans-
mitted to humans by bites of Simulium flies and is the world’s second-leading infectious cause of blindness (after
trachoma). Microfilariae migrate to the skin and eyes, and after the nematode dies, their endosymbiont Wolbachia pipientis
is released and causes a severe inflammatory response by the human immune system, leading to itching and sometimes
blindness. Transmission can be interrupted by long-term mass administration of ivermectin; a minimum of 15 years of
annual treatment is required, which is challenging especially in remote populations with limited access. Severe adverse
effects to treatment in patients also infected by Loa loa, are an additional complication [15]. Emerging ivermectin resistance
in O. vulvus may be an additional obstacle [25,26].
Poliomyelitis. Polio mainly affects children under 5 years of age and leads to irreversible paralysis in one in 200 infections
[27]. Since the beginning of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) in 1988, polio cases have decreased by over 99% and
the number of polio-endemic countries has been reduced from over a hundred to three (figure 1): Afghanistan, Pakistan and
Nigeria. Challenges to polio eradication include the need for multiple doses for sero-conversion, reduced efficacy of oral polio
vaccine in areas with high prevalence of enteric infections, gaps in serotype-specific immunity following local interruption of
transmission, vaccine refusal and circulating vaccine-derived viruses [28], as well as political instability and growing danger
to health workers [29]. The total cost for this effort currently exceeds $9 billion [30].
Rabies. An almost invariably fatal zoonotic disease that affects the central nervous system, the virus is commonly trans-
mitted by bites of infected animals. Globally, different regions are at different stages of rabies control and elimination. Canine
rabies, the main cause of humans rabies deaths globally, has been reduced by greater than 90 per cent in Latin America and
the Caribbean due to mass dog vaccination [31]. High dog population turnover means that repeat vaccination campaigns are
needed to sufficiently maintain coverage for transmission to be interrupted. In the Americas, achieving and sustaining high
coverage remains a challenge in the poorest populations, which are the last strongholds of infection. In Europe, mass vacci-
nation eliminated dog rabies in the mid-twentieth century (except for Turkey), at which point a virus variant circulating in
fox populations became apparent. Oral rabies vaccination has since eliminated fox rabies from western Europe, challenging
the notion that infection cannot be eliminated from a wildlife reservoir. A cordon sanitaire is now necessary to prevent
incursions from neighbouring endemic areas re-seeding infection [32].
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4to waning of immunity in the case of pertussis (also known as
whooping cough) and this can lead to resurgence in incidence
despite high vaccination coverage [39,40]. Such resurgence in
Western countries poses a particular, life-threatening risk for
unvaccinated infants [41].
(iv) Pathogen change
Prolonged use of treatment or prevention measures can addi-
tionally generate selection pressure that can lead to pathogen
adaptation, antigenic divergence or vaccine escape [42]. There
is evidence that such adaptations have contributed to decreased
vaccine efficacy and waning of immunity for pertussis [40,43],
whereas some polio vaccine strains reverted to virulence by
recombinationwith another virus (C-cluster coxsackie Aviruses)
[44]. As the main pathogen strains decline, minor strains maybecome more important—such as polio type 1 and 3 after eradi-
cation of type 2, variolaminor in the case of smallpox and themild
forms of rinderpest that circulated in wildlife populations.
(v) Atypical infection reservoirs
Once common sources of infection are controlled, other,
sometimes atypical, sources become important. For polio,
asymptomatic and immunocompromised individuals who
excrete the virus long-termwill continue to cause new infections
[45]. For measles, the decrease in perceived individual risk of
disease contributes to vaccine refusal, leading to outbreaks in
unvaccinated subpopulations [22,46]. During the rinderpest end-
game, seasonallymigrating pastoralists’ herds repeatedly spread
the disease to adjacent sedentary livestock [2]. For treatable neg-
lected tropical diseases (NTDs), most drugs used in preventative
Box 2. Definitions.
Eradication: permanent reduction to zero of the worldwide incidence of infection caused by a specific pathogen
established in a human or animal population, as a result of deliberate efforts, with no more risk of reintroduction.
Elimination (interruption of transmission): reduction to zero incidence of infection caused by a specific established patho-
gen in a defined geographical area, as a result of deliberate efforts; continued actions to prevent re-establishment of
transmission may be required.
Control: reduction of disease incidence, prevalence, morbidity and/or mortality to a locally acceptable level as a result of
deliberate efforts; continued intervention measures are required to maintain the reduction.
Elimination as a public health issue: targets set for political reasons, dependent on diseases and goals, for example, less than
one case in 10 000 for leprosy [33].
Basic reproductive number, R0: the average number of secondary cases caused by a single infected individual in a
completely susceptible population.
Effective reproductive number, RE: the average number of secondary cases caused by a single infected individual in a par-
tially immune population (or where proportion p of the population is receiving control, RC as in Smith et al. [20]);
RE ¼ R0(12 p). Determines how quickly we reach elimination; for RE ¼ 0.75 time to elimination is twice as long as for
RE ¼ 0.5 if all other things were equal [34].
Herd immunity: the level of population-specific immunity where the pathogen is unable to maintain its reproductive rate
above unity and continue circulating in the population; crucial for eradication efforts, as it is not necessary to vaccinate every-
one in order to eliminate a pathogen.
Critical eradication threshold, pc: the proportion of the susceptible population that needs to be vaccinated in order to
interrupt transmission in the population and achieve herd immunity; pc ¼ 1 – 1/R0.
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5chemotherapy andmass drug administration have exclusion cri-
teria; for example, pregnant women are ineligible for treatment
with all drugs used for NTDs, and some children are ineligible
for some drugs (e.g. children under the age of 9 for doxycycline,
etc.) [15], and these individuals continue tobepotential reservoirs
for infection. Control of the pathogen in human populations can
also lead to its relative concentration in less accessible animal
reservoirs (e.g. schistosomes in the Philippines, distributed
across dogs, horses, pigs and sheep; [15]); or for exclusively
animal pathogens, in alternative hosts. A mild variant of rinder-
pest circulating in wildlife populations became apparent only
during the endgame [2]. For FMD, identifying and removing car-
riers of infection poses a major challenge during the endgame
[47,48]. All of these atypical sources of infection may be
spatially/temporally clustered, with dynamical repercussions.(b) Control measures need to change
(i) Surveillance requirements change during different phases
of control
Surveillance serves multiple purposes: finding remaining
cases of circulating infection; measuring and mapping uptake
of vaccine or drugs; detecting emergence of resistance; and
identifying populations at risk. Identifying the remaining
pockets of susceptible individuals is essential for focusing con-
trol efforts, but the spatial distribution and demographic
characteristics of these individuals may have altered by the
endgame [23]. Ideally, susceptibles could be identified by
population-wide sero-surveys, but this is both practically diffi-
cult and costly. For human infections, those who are ineligible
for treatment must be closely monitored and given alternative
preventative measures (e.g. bed nets against mosquitoes given
for malaria are also helpful in preventing transmission of
lymphatic filariasis [13]).
Detecting infection at very low levels is much harder and
requires ever more sensitive and accurate detection methods,
as does detection of asymptomatic cases and long-termshedders. These individuals may become more important in
the endgame, as occurred, for example, in the elimination of
polio [49]. Routine surveillance may no longer be sufficient,
and newmethodsmay be necessary, such as active case search-
ing, shown to be effective for smallpox [1]. Remaining infections
will naturally tend to be in populations overlooked by interven-
tions until this point (remote locations, areas of civil strife,
impoverished communities, migratory populations). Local
knowledge of communities was exploited for both smallpox
and rinderpest through participatory methods. For rinderpest,
in particular, this facilitated surveillance in populations other-
wise inaccessible to traditional veterinary services [50]. These
innovations in surveillance involved little if any new technol-
ogy, but instead built on thorough investigative epidemiology
and local knowledge (from communities and determined
fieldworkers) to identify the causes of persistent transmission.
(ii) Implementing control measures becomes harder
As the endgame approaches, the remaining foci of infection
are likely to be the hardest to reach geographically, medically
and socially (in terms of persuading vaccine refusers to get
vaccinated [22]). Geographically, the last foci could be in the
most remote areas, or in unapproachable terrain owing to
war and civil unrest, as is the case with guinea worm [15].
Alternatively, remaining foci could be in the densest conurba-
tions where identifying and reaching susceptible individuals
may be logistically demanding. Densely aggregated urban
populations often include informal communities in poor
areas, weakly documented by censuses or formal registration
systems. This makes both estimating vaccine requirements,
and achieved levels of coverage difficult, andmay lead to over-
estimation of coverage success, allowing areas to harbour
persistent transmission. To achieve elimination for polio in
India, researchers drew on local knowledge to develop detailed
microplans in Indian cities, identifying pockets of suscepti-
bility as targets for vaccination campaigns [28]. In densely
populated areas, control may be further exacerbated if the R0
of a pathogen increases with population density [51, p. 89].
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6Indeed, patterns of smallpox incidence were indicative of
increasing transmission with population density [52].
Achieving and maintaining high vaccination coverage is
key for the elimination of vaccine-preventable diseases. How-
ever, most vaccines require refrigeration, and consequently,
the requirement for a ‘cold-chain’ infrastructure presents an
important operational limitation. For example, for childhood
diseases targeted by the extended programme of immuniz-
ation (EPI), coverage is often lowest in populations that are
more remote, and this remains an obstacle to interrupting
transmission [53]. The development of thermostable vaccines
was a key innovation for reaching remote or otherwise inac-
cessible populations, critical to both successful eradication
programmes (smallpox and rinderpest). Thermostability was
also a critical requirement in the development of oral vaccines
for vaccinating wildlife against rabies [54].
If reaching people is measured in terms of treatment suc-
cess, then complications such as co-infections can reduce the
efficacy of control programmes. For example, gut parasites
reduce sero-conversion from oral polio vaccine increasing the
number of required doses to 6 or 7 in some areas of India
[55]. Similarly, for control measures involving chemotherapy,
individual heterogeneity in absorbing drugs will affect efficacy.
(iii) Costs per case prevented increase
Locating infected individuals and remaining susceptibles
becomes increasingly hard and expensive. Costs of scaling-
up control and vaccination programmes increase [56]. Control
measures must be maintained until the last case is no longer
infectious, and therefore costs per case escalate given the long
epidemic tail of low incidence that is typical of the endgame
(figure 2, polio). The transient dynamics of infection will there-
fore be key determinants of time to elimination, and associated
costs ofmaintaining control effort. For example, successive oral
vaccination campaigns led to massive reductions in the inci-
dence of wildlife rabies across Europe, but disproportionately
greater effort was required during the endgame [32].
These escalating costs and effort can provide a motivation
to switch strategies from, for example, mass delivery of vaccine
or drugs with the aim of achieving herd immunity, to targeted
delivery in remaining foci of infection or high-risk locations or
populations.While such a switch is potentially cost-saving, it is
also very risky if implemented prematurely (rinderpest and
FMD both experienced resurgence following premature cessa-
tion of vaccination [2,14]). This is more likely if surveillance is
inadequate. For diseases where serological surveillance is
required, the need to discontinue vaccination so that sero-
positives through infection can be differentiated from those
that are vaccine-derived, is inherently risky. For both rinder-
pest [2] and FMD [14], decisions were required to stop
vaccinating in order to be able to assess disease-free status.
(iv) Waning support
As costs accumulate, donors fatigue. If donorswithdraw, then an
eliminationprogramme canbe jeopardized and there is a riskof a
return to endemicity, with potentially damaging events along
the way. Responding to re-emergence is particularly expensive,
but is vital to prevent incursions from establishing. Dealing
with importedpolio outbreaks inAfrican countries thatwerepre-
viously free of wild-type poliovirus cost US$ 850 million from
2003 until 2009 [57]. Communities also become less engaged as
disease incidence declines, and become correspondingly lessinvested in control activities, or start actively refusing the vac-
cine. This can be particularly problematic where communities
are facing many other life-threatening infections for which
they are receiving comparatively little support, although still
receiving treatment for an apparently vanished infection [22].
Once eradication has been achieved, returns on investment
are potentially infinite [58], but to secure commitments, elimin-
ation programmes typically need to be time-bound, providing
a target which all stakeholders work towards. The more
obstacles arise during the endgame, and the more prolonged
an elimination programme is, the more difficult it becomes to
continue to secure financial (and political) support. A shifting
timeline is common for elimination programmes, with advo-
cates for polio eradication having recently pushed for an
emergency action plan to finally end transmission and prevent
further escalation of costs [29]. Ultimately, if targets are not
met and diseases remain endemic, then support for future
elimination efforts is likely to be even more difficult to solicit.
(v) Incentives change during the endgame
Individual and societal incentives differ greatly during the
endgame. For an immunizing infection, it might be best for
society to vaccinate above the level of herd immunity to elim-
inate the disease. Society can then reap the benefits of lower
infection rates and associated costs of treatment, increased
productivity, and even savings from vaccination cessation
in the case of global eradication. From an individual perspec-
tive, incentives to get vaccinated or to vaccinate your animals
[14,31] rapidly diminish as the threat of infection becomes
very slim during the endgame. The risks are further reduced
because of protection provided by herd immunity [58]. For
the individual, risks from adverse effects from vaccination
may be perceived to exceed the risk of infection, which
additionally contributes to vaccine refusal [22] (see box 3). As
the remaining susceptibles will increasingly consist of vaccine
refusers, refusal has a disproportionately larger impact during
the endgame compared with the middle game. Financing
incentives also change during the endgame and it becomes
increasingly important to coordinate international and donor
financing, as some communities or countries might need
more help than others, especially because local health priorities
might not include eradication [9,65]. This was the case in
Ethiopia, where famine posed a much bigger problem than
smallpox circulating in mild, variola minor, form [1].
Until a disease is globally eradicated, there is a risk
of re-emergence in populations where RE is greater than 1
(box 2). Precautions for dealing with this risk depend on the
route by which a disease is transmitted and the mobility of
populations. The presence of endemic disease in neighbouring
regions poses a threat to disease-free countries, and this can
incentivize investment to support the efforts of neighbours.
This solidarity is evident in the Americas where countries
capable of producing surplus vaccine or with greater wealth
provide support to countries struggling to eliminate canine
rabies [31]. Similarly, for this reason, the EU is financing a
100 km wide cordon sanitaire of oral rabies vaccination, to
prevent the spread of fox rabies back into the region [32].
For diseases that can be easily transported long distances
(e.g. polio), these risks are more global.
Our ability to successfully overcome these issues is com-
promised by serious knowledge gaps across an array of
infections and contexts. In §3, we introduce some of the
major knowledge gaps in infectious disease control.
Box 3. The role of the media.
The media plays an important role in disease-elimination efforts, advocating for increased support, disseminating success
stories and often acting as an informal source of surveillance information. This role can be very positive but the media
also has potential to have hugely detrimental impacts. Bad news travels fast, and rumours can be very damaging when pro-
gramme success relies on participation of all (or a large percentage of) members of a community [59]. Even though it has
since been proven that there are no causal links between use of the mumps-measles-rubella (MMR) vaccine and autism,
media reporting of causality lead to loss of faith in vaccination [60]. This has lead to large outbreaks of measles in the
UK (the most recent one in Wales affecting huge numbers of 10–18 year olds [61]) indicative of renewed endemic circulation
of infection due to declines in herd immunity [62].
Attempts to present a balanced view in the media invariably lead to overexposure of rumours that are not supported by
scientific evidence. For vaccines, this has meant an increase in perceived risks of adverse events, leading to vaccine refusal.
Likewise, media reporting of propaganda about the safety of vaccines or their misappropriation for political purposes can be
far-reaching, such as during the boycott of polio vaccination in Nigeria [63]. Negative reporting can cause donors to pull out,
which again was a problem in Nigeria [64], and can be catastrophic if they lead to a loss of community support. Trying to
improve coverage after a scare story is always difficult. Premature reporting of potential success may also be detrimental, if it
corresponds to a relaxation of control and prevention measures, as occurred in Bali when several newspapers reported that
rabies had been eliminated from the island.
The large audience and potential to drive behaviour change, however, means that the media is a very powerful force.
Successful programmes work with the media to help ensure the spread of the right messages as part of their operations
(e.g. guinea worm). Drawing attention to a disease through the media helps to maintain momentum during a drawn-out
endgame, particularly of politicians and donors, whose commitment is integral to programme success.
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(a) Spatial heterogeneity and connectivity
Heterogeneityandconnectivityof populations are key to disease
persistence, but are both host/vector- and pathogen-dependent;
consequently, characterizing them may be challenging. For
example, the remaining foci of infection may be in remote
locations where detection is hardest, and may thus remain
undiscovered. Even if their location is known, establishing the
degree to which these foci are connected to other locations is
rarely straightforward, but of great relevance, as weakly con-
nected places may be relatively ineffective at propagating
infection, and therefore of less concern for the endgame than
better connected locations [20]. The degree to which com-
pleteness and evenness is required for control measures
(vaccine distribution, mass drug administration or preventive
chemotherapy) also depends on the connectedness of popula-
tions. For the elimination of rabies, heterogeneity in coverage
can be highly problematic, prolonging the duration of an elimin-
ation programme [32] and jeopardizing chances of success [66].
Understanding spatial connectivity can also be crucial to
identifying the optimal operational unit for control and surveil-
lance. Ideally, these units should reflect epidemiological units,
so that, for example, if an outbreak response is required, then it
is focused around where the outbreak is expected to occur, and
not excessively deployed in areas that are unlikely to be affected
(e.g. rivers andmountain ranges act as natural boundaries to the
spread of rabies [67]). Likewise, surveillance that does not to
some degree reflect epidemiological units is at risk of entirely
neglecting some areas and over-sampling others. The related
question of the degree to which control efforts may be spatially
targeted (e.g. for immunizing infections, focusing on locations
above the critical community size (CCS) because those below
the CCS will go extinct independently [68]) is of crucial impor-
tance where resources are limited, but requires a combination
of modelling (box 4) with data that are rarely available.
Once disease has been eliminated from a given region, the
mobility of populations and transmissibility of the pathogendetermines both the likelihood of re-emergence and the
extent of measures needed to prevent or respond to re-
emergence [83]. For human pathogens that spread quickly,
the risk is global, while for diseases where either the hosts
or parasites are not readily transported preventative
measures can be more spatially restricted and elimination
can be implemented more gradually. However, pathogen-
specific research is required to develop tailored action plans.
(b) The timelines of control and transition to
the endgame
Just as the spatial scale of control efforts may be poorly known,
the time-scale of control effort may be hard to predict. For both
smallpox and rinderpest, the endgame was relatively short
(figure 1), although eradication was declared almost a decade
after the last case of rinderpest was detected [84]. By contrast,
the endgame has been much more prolonged for dracunculia-
sis and polio (figures 1 and 2), increasing the costs of these
programmes (table 1). The length of the endgame is likely to
be a complicated function of the underlying biology of the
pathogen, the demography of the host(s), the connectedness
of affected populations, the speed of roll out of control
measures, their efficacy and the capacity for sustained effort,
likely to be itself shaped by political agendas and financing.
Consequently, it is almost inevitable that it will be hard to
establish whether the endgame is realistically achievable
within a finite time-horizon.
Another important aspect of the time-scale of elimination is
the duration of transient dynamics (i.e. short-term fluctuations
in incidence, thatmay even exceed previous levels of incidence,
but that will settle to an equilibrium). For immunizing infec-
tions, transient dynamics may be expressed via susceptible
build-up with late-age large outbreaks (i.e. honeymoons). For
other pathogens such as helminths with long lifespans that
are not vulnerable to control measures, duration of transient
dynamics will be shaped by the persistence of adult worms.
Anticipating and monitoring these dynamics will be
Table 1. Costs of elimination campaigns (ERR, economic rate of return).
disease time period cost (in $ million)a beneﬁt–cost ratio reference
malaria 1957–1975 .2000 17 : 1 [85,86]
smallpox 1967–1979 98 (international)
298 (total)
483 : 1 (international)
159 : 1 (total)
[87,88]
rinderpest 1986–2008 610 studies ongoing (60 highest estimate)
4–16 for Chad
[84,89]
guinea worm 1986–2015 350 29% ERR [13,90]
polio 1988–2013 9500 [30]
aIn US dollars of the indicated time period.
Box 4. The role of modelling.
Application of mathematical methods in epidemiology dates back to 1760 and the seminal paper by Daniel Bernoulli that
investigates the age-specific impact of smallpox inoculation [69]. A century and a half later, Ronald Ross’ mathematical
models of malaria [70–72] and Kermack & McKendrick’s compartmental models [73–75] lay the foundations for the
design and quantitative evaluation of control strategies, in particular, conditions for elimination (see critical eradication
threshold and definitions for R0 and RE in box 2). This was followed by the development of an array of economic models.
From an economic perspective, optimal strategies will minimize the combined costs of disease burden and control
measures; elimination may not always be the best outcome (see Barrett [58] for a detailed overview of economics of eradica-
tion). Depending on local epidemiology and economic constraints, the optimal strategy can range anywhere from no
intervention to elimination [65]. Cost–benefit analyses of specific country control programmes generally compare a small
number of different strategies (not necessarily focusing on the optimal strategy), partly as a result of the difficulty of effec-
tively evaluating the relevant costs [76]. Data are rarely available to define the precise functional form of infection costs or
how exactly costs of control scale with control intensity (fig. 4 in Freuling et al. [32] illustrates these difficulties). Estimating
economic feasibility of eradication programmes requires extrapolating these local cost-effectiveness analyses globally (see
table 1 for overview of estimated cost-effectiveness of certain elimination programmes). Additionally, such global extrapol-
ations are often based on data from a handful of countries [77] introducing a potential bias. In the absence of data, strategic
modelling has been essential in guiding an overview of key issues.
Data-driven modelling analyses have been deployed to guide policy adapted to local heterogeneities (degree of season-
ality in transmission, human demography, etc.) for a range of infections (FMD [78], measles outbreak response [79],
designing vaccination strategies [80]). In the context of the endgame, there has been considerable data-driven modelling
to predict the impacts of control programmes [34,38,81], or the impact of climate change on disease transmission and distri-
bution [82]. This exercise is often data-limited (see §3). For example, while models suggest that it might be possible to not
vaccinate areas below the CCS for immunizing vaccines [68], this will depend crucially on the degree to which these locations
are connected to the rest of the population, which is very rarely known. Modelling may still be useful here, as it allows
exploration of knowledge gaps, and may inform data collection necessary to close these gaps [24].
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8complicated by challenges to surveillance when incidence is at
very low levels. Transient dynamics may be amplified by evol-
ution of the pathogens in response to control measures,
towards immune escape, drug resistance and, where live vac-
cines are used, the emergence of vaccine-derived viruses
(observed for both rinderpest and polio [2,28]). Knowledge of
these time-scales is clearly key, but still profoundly lacking.
The time-scale over which it is appropriate to relax control
measures following elimination is another key question; relat-
ing to both the question of transient duration and of spatial
connectivity (above). Early cessation of control measures
could lead to catastrophic re-emergence (as seen for rinder-
pest [2]), but costs of continued control are difficult to
justify to funders, when disease has not been seen for some-
time. International organizations (WHO, OIE) may specify
periods for maintained control with no detected cases for cer-
tification of freedom, but there has been little research on
optimizing these targets. Furthermore, should eradication
succeed, post-elimination measures ought to be in place tominimize the risk of re-emergence of the same or a related
pathogen that could invade a newly vacated niche [91], but
this is an even more uncertain area.
It is very hard to anticipate how long investment and
energy can realistically be sustained relative to the time
needed to achieve elimination (see range of costs in table 1).
Clear goals and deadlines for eradication are especially
important, as a prolonged endgame leads to donor fatigue;
but these are complicated for all the reasons detailed
above. Many target deadlines become moving targets, with
potentially negative repercussions.(c) Unanticipated immunological hurdles
A final area dominated by knowledge gaps is the degree to
which unanticipated immunological hurdles to elimination
may arise. For example, for infections where boosting of
immunity is occurring via natural infection, this process
may not be apparent until the ecology of the pathogen has
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org
PhilTransR
SocB
368:20120137
9been radically altered (e.g. as happened for pertussis [40]).
For pathogens such as malaria, where low immunity is
linked to the most severe infections [92], and frequent re-
exposure maintains high immunity, control measures may
counterintuitively lead to an increase in adverse outcomes.
These outcomes may only become apparent when control
measures have been so effective that some portions of the
population have very weak immunity, or that remaining
cases are linked to immunosuppressing infections, with all
the consequent challenges in terms of reservoirs, etc. (see
above). This is exemplified by the situation in India, where
despite repeat campaigns with some children receiving more
than 20 doses of polio vaccine, transmission still occurred. To
solve this, a switch to a more immunologically effective mono-
valent vaccine was required [28,55]. The switch was achieved
through an unusual investment in vaccine development
addressing safety and ethical requirements to fast track the
deployment of the new vaccine.
Immunity may cease to be effective across populations
as a whole if vaccine/immunological escape occurs (the
time-scales of this are also very hard to anticipate). Where
cross-immunity is repressing a co-infecting pathogen, elimin-
ation of one pathogen may release the other, with potentially
negative consequences if the second pathogen is more proble-
matic (note that this may also occur through relaxation of
exclusion via resource-mediated competition) [91].
The implications of the endgame issues and knowledge
gaps described above all play out in the context of the socio-
economic and political settings in which elimination efforts
are deployed. In §4, we provide an overview of how these set-
tings have changed, and have influenced the implementation
of elimination programmes and their outcomes.4. Implementation of elimination efforts and
health systems
One of the major criticisms of elimination programmes, also
referred to as ‘vertical programmes’ is that they selectively
target and prioritize a specific issue sometimes at the expense
of comprehensive primary care. For human infections, hori-
zontal programmes, by contrast, focus on strengthening
primary care and providing ‘health for all’, where selection
and prioritization of interventions are shaped by a country’s
health situations and available government funding. For
animal infections, horizontal programmes are equivalent to
general strengthening of veterinary services without focusing
on a specific pathogen. For countries with weak horizontal
programmes or veterinary services, elimination efforts may
provide an opportunity to strengthen primary healthcare by
integrating their benefits such as training of personnel,
improved infrastructure and surveillance capacity including
access to diagnostic laboratories. For example, the yellow
fever programme developed the first nationwide administra-
tive health systems in many countries, the yaws eradication
initiative provided many basic health services and improved
national surveillance, the smallpox programme trained an
international cadre of health officials in epidemiology and
surveillance and served as a basis for EPI globally [9],
whereas the polio programme established a global laboratory
network that can be used for other health initiatives [93].
Despite these benefits to primary care, the polio eradication
programme has been criticized for draining scarce resources ofcountries where polio initially was not a priority, such as India.
For every dollar of foreign funding originally invested in polio
elimination in India, the country has spent a hundred dollars
more, totalling US$ 2.5 billion, which is more than what the
USA has spent on polio eradication worldwide [94]. India has
now been polio-free for over a year, which is an extraordinary
achievement that took an enormous amount of effort. However,
non-polio acute flaccid paralysis (AFP), which has twice the
fatality rate of wild polio, and other enteric infections remain
a problem [94]. Investing part of that sum into improving sani-
tation and access to potablewater could have prevented some of
the non-polio AFP cases as well as many other enteroviruses
and gastrointestinal infections spread by the faecal–oral route.
While eradication programmes require a ‘vertical approach’
in terms of targeted disease control, clear goals and deadlines,
they can and should be integrated in current health systems
and involve local communities (as was the case with smallpox
and rinderpest) rather than having a ‘monolithic’ approach
with a separate cadre of full-time workers (malaria eradication
programme 1955–1978). Elimination programmes also need
to be flexible, and recognize that strategies may need to be
updated depending on ongoing research and fieldwork, local
demography and pathogen or host changing ecologies. The
rigid, ‘one size fits all’ approach failed in malaria [95].
Since the era of smallpox eradication, funding for elimin-
ation programmes has greatly changed. In the 1960s, funding
was mostly provided by the WHO and the nation states.
Today, WHO largely has a regulatory role, whereas funding
is sourced by many non-governmental organizations, the
World Bank and charitable foundations such as the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation, the Carter Center, Rotary Inter-
national and global alliances of these partners (e.g. GAVI
Alliance, formerly the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immu-
nization). While government funding is subject to prioritizing
amongmultiple interventions, foundations often fund a specific
intervention directly and vertically. These contrasting routes
could potentially lead to diffusion of responsibility, and neg-
lected issues are likely to remain unfunded and untreated.
This is particularly true for developing countries dependent
on technical and financial support from external donors [95].
The millennium development goals (MDGs) have provided
further incentives to eliminate diseases associated with poverty
and childhoodmortality and have provided some coordination
amongst goals; however, considerable variability remains.5. Discussion
There are a number of prerequisites to the successful eradication
of a disease. Elimination needs to be biologically feasible
(e.g. no unknown or inaccessible animal reservoirs, the life
cycle of the pathogen can be interrupted, there are clear clinical
manifestations or laboratory tests to confirm cases, and limited
environmental persistence [96]). Effective control measures
need to exist (such as strongly immunizing vaccines, highly effi-
cacious drugs or simple behaviour changes) and they must be
long acting and cost effective. Even where all these conditions
are met, obstacles will emerge during the endgame.
It is of paramount importance that the coverage and comple-
teness of control measures required to eliminate the last foci be
achievable. The most inaccessible people and places cannot
be ignored as these are likely the last strongholds of infection.
Levels of surveillance sufficient tomonitor disease during earlier
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10phases of control may no longer detect infections circulating at
very low incidence. This creates a risk of premature discontinu-
ation of control measures and expensive re-emergence; yet,
the costs of prolonged efforts may be prohibitive and drain-
ing. Novel surveillance and control tools and strategies can
make crucial contributions. Historically, these have included
improved vaccines, treatments and delivery mechanisms
(thermostable vaccines, monovalent formulations, bifurcated
needles, bait delivery,measuring sticks, donateddrugs, contain-
ment vaccination strategies), and better detection methods
(rapid diagnostic tests ([50]; AFP laboratory networks; markers
of bait uptake [54]) often capitalizing on local knowledge and
communications networks for surveillance and monitoring.
However, none of these innovations matter in the absence
of political will and financial commitment—and commitment
across a whole spectrum of scales, from local religious leaders
through to government officials and global decision-makers.
Without political commitment, funding and human resources
will be lacking [14], as well as the capacity to engage commu-
nities to participate. Elimination programmes have been able
to command special attention in the political arena, including
the negotiation of localized ceasefires in order to reach
vulnerable children [64]. However, mishaps during the end-
game may shake both public and political confidence; and
perceptions of conflicting geopolitical agendas may further
complicate this. Recent violence directed towards healthcare
workers in the last remaining countries with continued
polio transmission poses a dilemma [29].
It is likely that even with the ideal configuration (a highly
efficacious, cost-effective control measure in a context of politi-
cal commitment), the time-horizon for eradication will be
limited to a rather narrow window of opportunity—with the
upper boundaries on the window being set by, for example,
the risk of emergence of resistance, or evolution of higher viru-
lence, or loss of political momentum, and escalating costs (the
last miles tend to cost more).
As we move towards local elimination for a diverse group
of infections, it is of value to note that eradication may not
always be the best option, particularly given the potential of
some pathogens to re-emerge with dire consequences. In an
era where pathogens such as polio can be easily synthesized
in a laboratory [97], it may be necessary to continue vaccinat-
ing after elimination, lowering the economic feasibility of
elimination [58,65]. The sustainability of control versus theextended benefits of eradication should be a key research
focus. For some diseases, in some circumstances, eradication
may not beworth trying. Global eradication may not currently
be feasible for measles due to its high R0, but local elimination
and continued control are extremely valuable, as reductions in
morbidity and mortality justify the continued maintenance of
childhood vaccinations (see also [23]). The same argument
holds for massive reductions in the burden of disease achieved
for example through chemotherapy for the control of helminths.
These results should be viewed as extremely beneficial, rather
than as a failure, because elimination has not been achieved.
Long-term control might be a more viable option to reduce
cases and prevent re-emergence especially if there is no feasible
post-eradication strategy.
Nonetheless, thanks to organization, innovation and deter-
mination, considerable progress has been made in the global
eradication and regional elimination of pathogens and para-
sites that threaten public and animal health. While the last
mile is often the longest, it can also bring the greatest benefits.
P.K. acknowledges the support from AXA Research Fund. C.J.E.M.
was funded by the Royal Society and Oxford University. K.H. was
funded by the Wellcome Trust and the Medical Research Council,
UK. C.J.E.M. and K.H. were supported by the Research and Policy
for Infectious Disease Dynamics (RAPIDD) programme of the
Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security and the Fogarty International Center, National Institutes of
Health. A.M. is supported by All Souls College, Oxford, UK. We
are grateful to the authors and reviewers of this special issue for
their valuable contributions, and especially to Helen Eaton for her
guidance and support.Endnotes
1Note that although transmission of SARS has been successfully
interrupted, SARS does not fit this definition of eradication, as it
never became established in the human population. Control of emer-
ging infections differs from control of long-established pathogens
and greatly relies on rigorous surveillance and prompt reporting, to
guide control methods that prevent initial pathogen spread (e.g.
quarantine proved very effective for SARS, but would not be feasible
in endemic populations).
2Yaws is caused by a spirochete Treponema pallidum, related to the one
that causes syphilis; WHO recently introduced a third target for era-
dication, in addition to polio and guinea worm, and launched a new
initiative to eradicate yaws by 2020 as one oral dose of azithromycin
is as effective as intramuscular penicillin [5].References1. Fenner F. 1988 The eradication of smallpox. Impact
Sci. Soc. 38, 147–158.
2. Roeder P, Mariner J, Kock R. 2013 Rinderpest: the
veterinary perspective on eradication. Phil. Trans.
R. Soc. B 368, 20120139. (doi:10.1098/rstb.2012.0139)
3. Henderson DA. 1999 Lessons from the eradication
campaigns. Vaccine 17, S53–S55. (doi:10.1016/
S0264-410X(99)00293-5)
4. Jacobson J. 2011 The role of research. In Disease
eradication in 21st century. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
5. Mitja` O, Asiedu K, Mabey D. 2013 Yaws. Lancet
381, 763–773. (doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(12)
62130-8)6. Na´jera JA, Gonza´lez-Silva M, Alonso PL. 2011 Some
lessons for the future from the Global Malaria
Eradication Programme (1955–1969). PLoS Med. 8,
e1000412. (doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000412)
7. Henderson DA. 1998 Eradication: lessons from
the past. Bull. World Health Organ. 76(Suppl. 2),
17–21.
8. Mariner JC, House JA, Mebus CA, Sollod AE, Chibeu
D, Jones BA, Roeder PL, Admassu B, van’t Klooster
GG. 2012 Rinderpest eradication: appropriate
technology and social innovations. Science 337,
1309–1312. (doi:10.1126/science.1223805)
9. Henderson DA, Klepac P. 2013 Lessons from the
eradication of smallpox: an interview with D. A.Henderson. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 368, 20130113.
(doi:10.1098/rstb.2013.0113)
10. Sumption K, Domenech J, Ferrari G. 2012
Progressive control of FMD on global scale. Vet. Rec.
170, 637–639. (doi:10.1136/vr.e4180)
11. Centre Center. 2013 Guinea worm facts.
See http//www.cartercenter.org/health/
guinea_worm/mini_site/facts.html (accessed 22
April 2013)
12. Biswas G, Sankara DP, Agua-Agum J, Maiga A.
2013 Dracunculiasis (guinea worm disease):
eradication without a drug or a vaccine. Phil.
Trans. R. Soc. B 368, 20120146. (doi:10.1098/rstb.
2012.0146)
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org
PhilTransR
SocB
368:20120137
1113. Hopkins DR. 2013 Disease eradication.
N. Engl. J. Med. 368, 54–63. (doi:10.1056/
NEJMra1200391)
14. Naranjo J, Cosivi O. 2013 Elimination of foot-and-
mouth disease in South America: lessons and
challenges. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 368, 20120381.
(doi:10.1098/rstb.2012.0381)
15. Bockarie MJ, Kelly-Hope LA, Rebollo M, Molyneaux
DH. 2013 Preventive chemotherapy as a strategy for
elimination of neglected tropical parasitic diseases:
endgame challenges. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 368,
20120144. (doi:10.1098/rstb.2012.0144)
16. WHO. 2012 World malaria report. Geneva,
Switzerland: WHO.
17. Bonds MH, Keenan DC, Rohani P, Sachs JD. 2010
Poverty trap formed by the ecology of infectious
diseases. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 277, 1185–1192.
(doi:10.1098/rspb.2009.1778)
18. Bonds MH, Dobson AP, Keenan DC. 2012 Disease
ecology, biodiversity, and the latitudinal gradient in
income. PLoS Biol. 10, e1001456. (doi:10.1371/
journal.pbio.1001456)
19. Sachs J, Malaney P. 2002 The economic and social
burden of malaria. Nature 415, 680–685. (doi:10.
1038/415680a)
20. Smith DL et al. 2013 A sticky situation: the
unexpected stability of malaria elimination. Phil.
Trans. R. Soc. B 368, 20120145. (doi:10.1098/rstb.
2012.0145)
21. WHO. 2013 Measles: fact sheet. Geneva,
Switzerland: WHO. See http//www.who.int/
mediacentre/factsheets/fs286/en/index.html
(accessed 22 April 2013)
22. Saint-Victor DS, Omer SB. 2013 Vaccine refusal and
the endgame: walking the last mile first. Phil.
Trans. R. Soc. B 368, 20120148. (doi:10.1098/rstb.
2012.0148)
23. Ferrari MJ, Grenfell BT, Strebel PM. 2013 Think
globally, act locally: the role of local demographics
and vaccination coverage in the dynamic response
of measles infection to control. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B
368, 20120141. (doi:10.1098/rstb.2012.0141)
24. Maiden MCJ. 2013 The impact of protein-conjugate
polysaccharide vaccines: an endgame for
meningitis? Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 368, 20120147.
(doi:10.1098/rstb.2012.0147)
25. Lustigman S, McCarter JP. 2007 Ivermectin
resistance in Onchocerca volvulus: toward a genetic
basis. PLoS Negl. Trop. Dis. 1, e76. (doi:10.1371/
journal.pntd.0000076)
26. Osei-Atweneboana MY, Awadzi K, Attah SK, Boakye
DA, Gyapong JO, Prichard RK. 2011 Phenotypic
evidence of emerging ivermectin resistance in
Onchocerca volvulus. PLoS Negl. Trop. Dis. 5, e998.
(doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0000998)
27. WHO. 2013 Polio: fact sheet. Geneva, Switzerland:
WHO.
28. Grassly NC. 2013 The final stages of the global
eradication of poliomyelitis. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B
368, 20120140. (doi:10.1098/rstb.2012.0140)
29. Callaway E. 2013 Public health: polio’s moving
target. Nature 496, 290–292. (doi:10.1038/
496290a)30. Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI). 2013
Global polio eradication initiative. financial resource
requirements 2012–2013. See http//www.
polioeradication.org/financing.aspx (accessed 22
April 2013)
31. Vigilato MAN, Clavijo A, Knobl T, Silva HMT, Cosivi
O, Schneider MC, Leanes LF, Belotto AJ, Espinal MA.
2013 Progress towards eliminating canine rabies:
policies and perspectives from Latin America and
the Caribbean. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 368, 20120143.
(doi:10.1098/rstb.2012.0143).
32. Freuling CM, Hampson K, Selhorst T, Schro¨der R,
Meslin FX, Mettenleiter TC, Mu¨ller T. 2013 The
elimination of fox rabies from Europe: determinants
of success and lessons for the future. Phil.
Trans. R. Soc. B 368, 20120142. (doi:10.1098/rstb.
2012.0142)
33. Noordeen SK. 1995 Elimination of leprosy as a
public health problem: progress and prospects. Bull.
World Health Organ. 73, 1.
34. Smith DL, Hay SI, Noor AM, Snow RW. 2009 Predicting
changing malaria risk after expanded insecticide-
treated net coverage in Africa. Trends Parasitol. 25,
511–516. (doi:10.1016/j.pt.2009.08.002)
35. McLean AR, Anderson RM. 1988 Measles in
developing-countries. II. The predicted impact of
mass vaccination. Epidemiol. Infect. 100, 419–442.
(doi:10.1017/S0950268800067170)
36. Rentsen T, Enkhtuya B, Nymadawa P, Kobune F,
Suzuki K, Yoshida H, Hachiya M. 2007 Measles
outbreak after a post-honeymoon period in
Mongolia, 2001. Jpn. J. Infect. Dis. 60, 198.
37. Kidd S et al. 2012 Measles outbreak in Burkina
Faso, 2009: a case–control study to determine
risk factors and estimate vaccine effectiveness.
Vaccine 30, 5000–5008. (doi:10.1016/j.vaccine.
2012.05.024)
38. Metcalf CJ, Lessler J, Klepac P, Cutts F, Grenfell BT.
2012 Impact of birth rate, seasonality and
transmission rate on minimum levels of coverage
needed for rubella vaccination. Epidemiol. Infect.
140, 2290–2301. (doi:10.1017/S09502688
12000131)
39. Lavine JS, King AA, Bjornstad ON. 2011 Natural
immune boosting in pertussis dynamics and the
potential for long-term vaccine failure. Proc. Natl
Acad. Sci. USA 108, 7259–7264. (doi:10.1073/pnas.
1014394108)
40. Mooi FR, van der Maas NAT, De Melker HE. 2013
Pertussis resurgence: waning immunity and
pathogen adaptation: two sides of the same coin.
Epidemiol. Infect. 1–10. (doi:10.1017/S0950268
813000071)
41. Forsyth K. 2007 Pertussis, still a formidable foe. Clin.
Infect. Dis. 45, 1487–1491. (doi:10.1086/522660)
42. McLean AR. 1995 Vaccination, evolution and
changes in the efficacy of vaccines: a theoretical
framework. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 261, 389–393.
(doi:10.1098/rspb.1995.0164)
43. Lavine J, Broutin H, Harvill ET, Bjørnstad ON. 2010
Imperfect vaccine-induced immunity and whooping
cough transmission to infants. Vaccine 29, 11–16.
(doi:10.1016/j.vaccine.2010.10.029)44. Jiang P, Faase JAJ, Toyoda H, Paul A, Wimmer E,
Gorbalenya AE. 2007 Evidence for emergence of
diverse polioviruses from C-cluster coxsackie A
viruses and implications for global poliovirus
eradication. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 104, 9457–
9462. (doi:10.1073/pnas.0700451104)
45. Kew OM, Sutter RW, de Gourville EM, Dowdle WR,
Pallansch MA. 2005 Vaccine-derived polioviruses
and the endgame strategy for global polio
eradication. Annu. Rev. Microbiol. 59, 587–635.
(doi:10.1146/annurev.micro.58.030603.123625)
46. Glass K, Kappey J, Grenfell BT. 2004 The effect of
heterogeneity in measles vaccination on population
immunity. Epidemiol. Infect. 132, 675–683. (doi:10.
1017/S0950268804002080)
47. Kitching P, Hammond J, Jeggo M, Charleston B,
Paton D, Rodriguez L, Heckert R. 2007 Global FMD
control: is it an option? Vaccine 25, 5660–5664.
(doi:10.1016/j.vaccine.2006.10.052)
48. Sutmoller P, Casas OR. 2002 Unapparent foot and
mouth disease infection (sub-clinical infections and
carriers): implications for control. Rev. Sci. Tech. (Int.
Office of Epizootics) 21, 519–529.
49. Hovi T, Shulman LM, van der Avoort H, Deshpande
J, Roivainen M, de Gourville EM. 2012 Role of
environmental poliovirus surveillance in global polio
eradication and beyond. Epidemiol. Infect. 140,
1–13. (doi:10.1017/S095026881000316X)
50. Mariner JC, Roeder PL. 2003 Use of participatory
epidemiology in studies of the persistence of
lineage 2 rinderpest virus in East Africa. Vet. Rec.
152, 641–647. (doi:10.1136/vr.152.21.641)
51. Anderson RM, May RM. 1991 Infectious diseases of
humans. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
52. Arita I, Wickett J, Fenner F. 1986 Impact of
population density of immunization programmes.
Epidemiol. Infect. 96, 459–466.
53. Schelling E, Bechir M, Ahmed MA, Wyss K, Randolph
TF, Zinsstag J. 2007 Human and animal vaccination
delivery to remote nomadic families, Chad. Emerg.
Infect. Dis. 13, 373. (doi:10.3201/eid1303.060391)
54. European Commission. 2002 The oral vaccination of
foxes against rabies. Report of the Scientific
Committee on Animal Health and Animal Welfare.
See http//ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/scah/out80_en.pdf.
55. Grassly NC, Jafari H, Bahl S, Durrani S, Wenger J,
Sutter RW, Aylward RB. 2009 Mucosal immunity
after vaccination with monovalent and trivalent oral
poliovirus vaccine in India. J. Infect. Dis. 200,
794–801. (doi:10.1086/605330)
56. Wolfson LJ et al. 2008 Estimating the costs of
achieving the WHO-UNICEF Global Immunization
Vision and Strategy, 2006–2015. Bull. World Health
Organ. 86, 27–39. (doi:10.2471/BLT.07.045096)
57. O’Reilly KM, Chauvin C, Aylward RB, Maher C, Okiror
S, Wolff C, Nshmirimana D, Donnelly CA, Grassly NC.
2011 A statistical model of the international spread
of wild poliovirus in Africa used to predict and
prevent outbreaks. PLoS Med. 8, e1001109. (doi:10.
1371/journal.pmed.1001109)
58. Barrett S. 2013 Economic considerations for the
eradication endgame. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 368,
20120149. (doi:10.1098/rstb.2012.0149)
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org
PhilTransR
SocB
368:20120137
1259. Salathe´ M, Khandelwal S. 2011 Assessing
vaccination sentiments with online social media:
implications for infectious disease dynamics and
control. PLoS Comput. Biol. 7, e1002199. (doi:10.
1371/journal.pcbi.1002199)
60. Gross L. 2009 A broken trust: lessons from the
vaccine–autism wars. PLoS Biol. 7, e1000114.
(doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1000114)
61. Wise J. 2013 Largest group of children affected by
measles outbreak in Wales is 10–18 year olds. BMJ
(Clin. Res. edn.) 346, f2545. (doi:10.1136/bmj.f2545)
62. Jansen VAA, Stollenwerk N, Jensen HJ, Ramsay ME,
Edmunds WJ, Rhodes CJ. 2003 Measles outbreaks in
a population with declining vaccine uptake. Science
301, 804–804. (doi:10.1126/science.1086726)
63. Jegede AS. 2007 What led to the Nigerian boycott
of the polio vaccination campaign? PLoS Med. 4,
e73. (doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040073)
64. Roberts L. 2004 Polio endgame - polio: the final
assault? Science 303, 1960–1968. (doi:10.1126/
science.303.5666.1960)
65. Klepac P, Laxminarayan R, Grenfell BT. 2011
Synthesizing epidemiological and economic optima
for control of immunizing infections. Proc. Natl
Acad. Sci. USA 108, 14 366–14 370. (doi:10.1073/
pnas.1101694108)
66. Townsend SE, Lembo T, Cleaveland S, Meslin FX,
Miranda ME, Putra AAG, Haydon DT, Hampson K.
2012 Surveillance guidelines for disease elimination:
a case study of canine rabies. Comp. Immunol.
Microbiol. Infect. Dis. (doi:10.1016/j.cimid.2012.
10.008)
67. Brunker K, Hampson K, Horton DL, Biek R. 2012
Integrating the landscape epidemiology and
genetics of RNA viruses: rabies in domestic dogs as
a model. Parasitology 1, 1–15. (doi:10.1017/
S003118201200090X)
68. Haydon DT, Cleaveland S, Taylor LH, Laurenson MK.
2002 Identifying reservoirs of infection: a conceptual
and practical challenge. Emerg. Infect. Dis. 8, 1468.
(doi:10.3201/eid0812.010317)
69. Bernoulli D. 1758 Re´flexions sur les avantages de
l’inoculation. Me´m. Paris, 439–482. Available at
http//cerebro.xu.edu/math/Sources/DanBernoulli/
1760_reflections_inoculation.pdf.
70. Ross R. 1916 An application of the theory of
probabilities of the study of a priori pathometry:
part I. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. A 92, 204–230. (doi:10.
1098/rspa.1917.0014)
71. Ross R, Hudson HP. 1917 An application
of the theory of probabilities to the study
of a priori pathometry: part II. Proc. R.
Soc. Lond. A 93, 212–225. (doi:10.1098/rspa.
1917.0014)
72. Ross R, Hudson HP. 1917 An application of the
theory of probabilities to the study of a prioripathometry: part III. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. A 93,
225–240. (doi:10.1098/rspa.1917.0015)
73. Kermack W, McKendrick A. 1927 A contribution
to the mathematical theory of epidemics.
Proc. R. Soc. Lond. A 115, 700–721. (doi:10.1098/
rspa.1927.0118)
74. Kermack WO, McKendrick AG. 1932 Contributions to
the mathematical theory of epidemics II: the
problem of endemicity. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. A 138,
55–83. (doi:10.1098/rspa.1932.0171)
75. Kermack WO, McKendrick AG. 1933 Contributions to
the mathematical theory of epidemics III: further
studies of this problem of endemicity. Proc. R.
Soc. Lond. A 141, 94–122. (doi:10.1098/rspa.1933.
0106)
76. Bae G-R, Choe YJ, Go UY, Kim Y-I, Lee J-K. 2013
Economic analysis of measles elimination program
in the Republic of Korea, 2001: a cost benefit
analysis study. Vaccine (doi:10.1016/j.vaccine.2013.
04.014)
77. Bishai D et al. 2012 Measles eradication versus
measles control: an economic analysis. J. Vaccines
Vaccin. S3:002. (doi:10.4172/2157-7560.S3-002)
78. Keeling MJ, Woolhouse MEJ, May RM, Davies G,
Grenfell BT. 2003 Modelling vaccination strategies
against foot-and-mouth disease. Nature 421, 136–
142. (doi:10.1038/nature01343)
79. Grais RF, Conlan AJK, Ferrari MJ, Djibo A, Le Menach
A, Bjornstad ON, Grenfell BT. 2008 Time is of the
essence: exploring a measles outbreak response
vaccination in Niamey, Niger. J. R. Soc. Interface 5,
67–74. (doi:10.1098/rsif.2007.1038)
80. Grassly NC, Fraser C, Wenger J, Deshpande JM, Sutter
RW, Heymann DL, Aylward RB. 2006 New strategies for
the elimination of polio from India. Science 314, 1150–
1153. (doi:10.1126/science.1130388)
81. Hampson K, Dushoff J, Cleaveland S, Haydon DT,
Kaare M, Packer C, Dobson A. 2009 Transmission
dynamics and prospects for the elimination of
canine rabies. PLoS Biol. 7, e1000053. (doi:10.1371/
journal.pbio.1000053)
82. Gething PW, Smith DL, Patil AP, Tatem AJ, Snow
RW, Hay SI. 2010 Climate change and the global
malaria recession. Nature 465, 342–345. (doi:10.
1038/nature09098)
83. Fraser C, Riley S, Anderson RM, Ferguson NM. 2004
Factors that make an infectious disease outbreak
controllable. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 101, 6146–
6151. (doi:10.1073/pnas.0307506101)
84. Normile D. 2008 Rinderpest. Driven to extinction.
Science 319, 1606–1609. (doi:10.1126/science.319.
5870.1606)
85. Jeffery GM. 1976 Malaria control in the twentieth
century. Am. J. Trop. Med. Hyg. 25, 361–371.
86. Mills A, Lubell Y, Hanson K. 2008 Malaria
eradication: the economic, financial and institutionalchallenge. Malaria J. 7, S11. (doi:10.1186/1475-
2875-7-S1-S11)
87. Fenner F, Henderson DA, Arita I, Jezek Z, Ladnyi ID.
1988 Smallpox and its eradication. Geneva,
Switzerland: World Health Organization.
88. Miller M, Barrett S, Henderson DA. 2006 Control and
eradication. In Disease control priorities in
developing countries (eds DT Jamison et al.),
2nd edn, pp. 1163–1176. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
89. FAO. 2012 An assessment of the socio-economic
impacts of global rinderpest eradication–
methodological issues and applications to rinderpest
control programmes in Chad and India. FAO Animal
Production and Health Working Paper No. 7.
Available from http//www.fao.org/docrep/015/
i2584e/i2584e00.pdf.
90. Kim A, Tandon A, Ruiz-Tiben E. 1997 Cost–benefit
analysis of the global dracunculiasis eradication
campaign (GDEC). World Bank, Africa Human
Development Department. Available from http//
cartercenter.org/documents/2101.pdf.
91. Lloyd-Smith JO. 2013 Vacated niches, competitive
release and the community ecology of pathogen
eradication. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 386, 20120150.
(doi:10.1098/rstb.2012.0150)
92. Luxemburger C, Ricci F, Nosten F, Raimond D,
Bathet S, White NJ. 1997 The epidemiology of
severe malaria in an area of low transmission in
Thailand. Trans. R. Soc. Trop. Med. Hyg. 91,
256–262. (doi:10.1016/S0035-9203(97)90066-3)
93. Aylward B, Olive JM, Hull HF, de Quadros CA,
Melgaard B. 1998 Disease eradication initiatives and
general health services: ensuring common principles
lead to mutual benefits. In The eradication of
infectious diseases: Dahlem Workshop reports (eds
WR Dowdle, DR Hopkins), pp. 61–74. Chichester,
UK: John Wiley & Sons.
94. Vashisht N, Puliyel J. 2012 Polio programme: let us
declare victory and move on. Indian J. Med. Ethics 9,
114–117.
95. Hinman AR, Hopkins DR. 1998 Lessons from
previous eradication programs. In The eradication of
infectious diseases: Dahlem Workshop reports (eds
WR Dowdle, DR Hopkins), pp. 19–32. Chichester,
UK: John Wiley & Sons.
96. Ottesen EA et al. 1998 Group report: how is
eradication to be defined and what are the
biological criteria. In The eradication of infectious
diseases: Dahlem Workshop reports (eds WR
Dowdle, DR Hopkins), pp. 47–59. Chichester, UK:
John Wiley & Sons.
97. Cello J, Paul AV, Wimmer E. 2002 Chemical synthesis
of poliovirus cDNA: generation of infectious virus in
the absence of natural template. Science 297,
1016–1018. (doi:10.1126/science.1072266)
